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The Use and Abuse of Peer Review
Organizations in Pennsylvania: An
Analysis of the Private Enterprise Peer
Review System Under The Motor Vehicle
Financial Responsibility Law of 1990
When you talk to a lawyer, he blames it on the insurance agent....
When you talk to an insurance agent, he blames it on the lawyers.
You talk to a legislator, he's either a lawyer or an insurance agent.'
I. Introduction
Few issues generate more discussion in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania than health care cost containment and automobile insurance
reform. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of 1990,2
commonly referred to as Act 6, was designed to address both of these
issues on a permanent basis.' The Act required insurers to freeze rates
at December 1989 levels4 and roll back premiums ten to twenty-two
percent, depending on whether an insured elects the "full tort" or
"limited tort" option.5 The primary cost saving mechanism used to
1. Jeffrey O'Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-
Fault Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 62 (1986) (quoting-Tom Dunkel, Battle for the Bucks, N.J.
MONTHLY, Nov. 1984, at 76).
2. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1701-1799.7 (Supp. 1993).
3. See infra note 34. The Financial Responsibility Law of 1990 was highly publicized
throughout the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Jodi Edna, Casey Signs Auto-Insurance Bill into Law,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 8, 1990, at AI; Joe Koscinski, Casey Signs Bill on Auto-Insurance
Reform, THE PATRIOT (Harrisburg, Pa.), Feb. 8, 1990, at Al; Tim Sanderson, Consumers Could
Be Saving More On Auto Insurance, Casey Says, PITTSBURGH PRESS, Oct. 3, 1990, at B10.
Although this Comment focuses on health care cost restrictions enacted as part of the
Pennsylvania automobile insurance reform law, the general subject of controlling spiraling health
care costs has elicited much discussion and debate. See, e.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, A Billion Here,
A Billion There, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1993, at A17; The Price of Health, ECONOMIST, March 20,
1993, at 15. Automobile insurance costs may be affected on a national level by the Clinton
Administration's proposed health insurance legislation, which addresses the issue of duplicate
medical benefits provided under health and automobile insurance policies. See ROBERT H. JOOST,
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND NO-FAULT LAW § 9:10 (2d ed. Supp. 1993). The proposed
legislation authorizes a commission to study the relationship between workers' compensation,
automobile insurance, and national health insurance benefits. S. 1757, § 10201, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1993).
4. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1799.7(d) (Supp. 1993).
5. Id. § 1797.7(b). "Full tort" coverage allows policyholders to recover all economic and
noneconomic damages suffered as.a result of an automobile accident that was caused by the fault of
another person. Id. § 1705(c). However, "limited tort" coverage, obtained in exchange for a
premium reduction, limits policyholders to recovery only for economic losses; insureds may not
pursue nonmonetary damages unless their injuries are "serious" or one of the specific statutory
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justify the premium reductions was the medical cost containment
provisions of section 1797 of the Act.6 Under this section, an insurer's
reimbursement of an accident victim's medical expenses is limited to
prevailing Medicare rates.7 Section 1797 also established a peer review
process to enable insurers to challenge the reasonableness and necessity
of medical treatment.8
Initially, the rate freeze and rollback measure was the most
controversial feature of Act 6. Insurance companies unsuccessfully
challenged the constitutionality of the new law, arguing that the rollback
provisions established an unconstitutional taking of property under both
the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions.9 Shortly thereafter, the Act's
peer review procedures were repeatedly challenged in courts across the
Commonwealth. 0 This litigation was sparked by the perception that the
private peer review system mandated by Act 6 was inherently biased in
favor of insurance companies to the detriment of automobile accident
victims. "
This Comment analyzes the effectiveness of the peer review system
that was created under section 1797 of Act 6. Part II traces the history
of automobile insurance medical cost containment in Pennsylvania, from
the no-fault system through the current fault-based system. Part III
analyzes recent litigation that has arisen from the perceived inequities of
the private peer review system. Part IV examines on a practical level the
constitutional implications of the private enterprise peer review system.
Part V advocates eliminating the current biased peer review system and
exceptions under the law is applicable. Id. §1705(d). Act 6 defines a serious injury as one
"resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious disfigurement." Id.
§ 1702.
6. The new rates applied to all policies issued or renewed on or after July 1, 1990. Id. §
1799.7(a). Act 6 authorized the Insurance Commissioner to grant aggrieved insurers relief from the
mandated rollbacks in "extraordinary circumstances." Id. § 1799.7(b)(3). Many insurance
companies unsuccessfully sought this statutory relief from the mandated rollbacks. See, e.g., Boston
Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't, 604 A.2d 1191 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991).
7. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1797(a) (Supp. 1993).
8. Id. § 1797(b). The medical cost containment provisions of § 1797 are outlined in
Appendix A. Appendix B reproduces the Insurance Department's regulatory peer review
procedures, which were created to clarify and effectuate the peer review process under § 1797(b).
9. E.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Foster, 732 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990). See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting property from being "taken or applied to
public use without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured").
For a detailed discussion of the constitutionality of the rate freeze and rollback measure, see
generally, T. Andrew Lingle, Comment, The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law of 1990: Constitutionality of Achieving Affordable Insurance Rates Through Freeze and
Rollback Measures, 96 DICK. L. REv. 303 (1992).
10. See cases cited infra note 75.
11. See infra parts lI and IV.
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adopting a neutral peer review selection process similar to the one set
forth under the 1993 amendments to the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act. 2 Finally, this Comment concludes that continuation
of the current peer review process established by section 1797 will only
increase litigation and health care costs, thereby frustrating the express
purpose of Act 6.
II. History of Automobile Insurance Medical Cost Containment
A. The Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 1974
No-fault automobile insurance compensates policyholders for
economic injuries sustained in automobile accidents regardless of the
fault of the insured. 3 Conversely, traditional tort-based liability
compensates only accident victims who prove that a policyholder was at
fault. '4 By providing coverage regardless of fault, no-fault schemes
reduce the amount of automobile accident tort litigation and thereby
result in monetary savings that are applied toward generous first-party
benefits. 5
The Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act of 197416
was enacted to compensate accident victims at a lower cost than
traditional tort-based liability insurance.'7 The No-Fault Act allowed
accident victims to recover unlimited medical and rehabilitation benefits
plus wage-loss benefits up to $15,000." Victims could also pursue a
private tort claim if medical losses exceeded a mere $750. '9
The low $750 tort threshold led to a proliferation of litigation, and
insurance companies found themselves subject to damages in tort while
12. See Workers' Compensation Act, Act No. 1993-44, sec. 15, § 420, 1993 Pa. Laws 190,
213-14 (amending 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 831-32). Under this system, the selection of an
independent peer review organization (PRO) by a governmental unit avoids the appearance of
impartiality that is created by a private contractual relationship between insurance companies and
PROs. Id. For the qualifications of those entitled to conduct peer review under the new Workers'
Compensation Act, see sec.3, § 109, 1993 Pa. Laws at 192.
13. O'Connell& Joost, supra note 1, at 63.
14. Id.
15. Michael E. Herron, No-Fault System Needs Repair, PA. L.J. REP., Feb. 8, 1982, at 2.
First-party benefits are those benefits that are available under an insured's own policy. See JoosT,
supra note 3, §§ 2.3-2.4. These benefits may include a combination of medical, income loss,
accidental health, and funeral benefits. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1712 (Supp. 1993).
16. Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, Act No. 176, 1974 Pa. Laws 489
(repealed 1984).
17. Id. § 102, 1974 Pa. Laws at 492-93 (repealed 1984). See also JAMES R. RONCA Er AL.,
PENNSYLVANIA MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE, § 1.2 at 13 (1986).
18. § 202, 1974 Pa. Laws at 508-509 (repealed 1984).
19. § 301(5)(B), 1974 Pa. Laws at 514 (repealed 1984).
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providing unlimited medical coverage.10 Consequently, insurance
premiums increased a staggering 875% from July 1975 to September
1982.21 Obviously, the No-Fault Act failed to strike the proper balance
between the amount of medical benefits paid to a victim and the
corresponding restrictions on tort damage payments. 2
B. The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of 1984
In response to sky-rocketing insurance premiums, the Pennsylvania
Legislature repealed the No-Fault Act in 1984 and enacted the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). The new law was
designed to provide basic protection for accident victims at a lower cost
without restricting the right to sue.' The MVFRL required motor
vehicle insurers to offer certain minimum benefits, including $10,000 in
medical and rehabilitative expenses, a $5,000 wage loss benefit, and a
funeral benefit of at least $1,500.
Under the MVFRL, an insurer was only obligated to cover medical
expenses that were reasonable, medically necessary, and related to an
injury arising from a motor vehicle accident.' The provider's charge
could not exceed the usual and customary charge for similar treatment of
uninsured patients.27 Further, the law only required an insurer to pay
claims for medical benefits when the insured or his medical provider
submitted reasonable proof of the amount of medical benefits due.'
Under the MVFRL, there was no specific statutory or regulatory
procedure for evaluating disputed claims. If an insurance company
refused to pay benefits, the insured could bring a civil action.29 The
20. See Herron, supra note 15, at 2. The low threshold allowed more accident victims to bring
lawsuits in tort and forced insurance companies to raise premiums. O'Connell & Joost, supra
note 1, at 66. A higher threshold would have reduced the number of lawsuits and decreased tort
damage payments by insurance companies. See id. at 64. This type of cost savings could have
translated into premium reductions for consumers. Id.
21. See RONCA Er AL., supra note 17, § 1.2 at 13.
22. For a discussion of this balancing concept, see O'Connell & Joost, supra note 1, at 63-67.
23. ActNo. 1984-11,sec. 3, 1984Pa. Laws 26, 28-52 amended by Act No. 1984-12, see. 3,
1984 Pa. Laws 53, 53-68 (repealed 1990).
24. See James R. Ronca, New Insurance Law Effective October 1, PA. L.J. REP., Feb. 20,
1984, at 1.
25. Act No. 1984-12, sec. 3, § 1711, 1984 Pa. Laws at 55 (repealed 1990).
26. § 1712(1), 1984 Pa. Laws at 55 (repealed 1990).
27. § 1797, 1984 Pa. Laws at 68 (repealed 1990).
28. Act No. 1984-11, sec. 3, § 1716, 1984 Pa. Laws at 32 (repealed 1990). See, e.g., Ralph
v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 525 A.2d 1234, 1240 (Pa. 1987) (holding that courts must determine the
existence of reasonable proof based on particular facts of each case).
29. Act No. 1984-12, sec. 3, § 1721(a), 1984 Pa. Laws at 58 (repealed 1990). The insured
was required to bring an action for unpaid medical benefits within four years of the accident. Id.
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insured was entitled to recover any benefits wrongfully withheld plus
interest commencing thirty days after the insurer received reasonable
proof of the amount of loss.' ° The generous benefit procedures,
combined with the increase in automobile tort litigation, once again led
to a dramatic increase in insurance rates.3'
C. Act 6: The Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of 1990
In an effort to regulate and reduce the cost of automobile insurance
in Pennsylvania,32 the Legislature amended the MVFRL in 1990 by
enacting Act 6.11 Act 6 made numerous changes to motor vehicle
insurance law. These changes were made to redress what most observers
believed were the root causes of the automobile insurance crisis:
escalating health care costs and the increasing number of automobile tort
lawsuits.' To remedy rising medical costs, the Act 6 amendments to
section 1797 limited the fees a provider may charge35 and established
a private peer review system for evaluating and challenging claims by
providers .36
Act 6 was patterned after Michigan's no-fault insurance law.37
Like Act 6, Michigan's no-fault insurance law contains a "limited tort
option"" and caps the amount that medical providers can bill insurance
companies for various benefits.39  However, Michigan provides
If benefits had already been paid, an action for additional benefits must have been initiated within
four years of the last payment of benefits. Id.
30. Act No. 1984-11, sec. 3, § 1716, 1984 Pa. Laws at 32 (repealed 1990).
31. See Lingle, supra note 9, at 309.
32. See generally 1990 PA. LEGIS. J. HOUSE 202, 202-26.
33. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1701-1799.7 (Supp. 1993).
34. Representative Freind, a primary sponsor of Act 6, stated during the final House debate
of the automobile insurance bill: "The beauty of this bill ... is that it attacks on a permanent basis
the two root causes for rising rates - health care costs, and more importantly, the pain and suffering
claims and lawsuits." 1990 PA. LEGIS. J. HOUSE 202, 223 (remarks of Representative Freind).
35. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1797(a) (Supp. 1993).
36. Id. § 1797(b).
37. See 1990 PA. LEGIS. J. HOUSE at 218. See generally MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.13 101-
.13179 (Callaghan 1987 & Supp. 1993-94).
38. Michigan accident victims can recover tort damages only for death, permanent serious
disfigurement, or serious impairment of bodily function. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13135(1)
(Callaghan 1987). For a detailed discussion of the Michigan no-fault act, see Nassar v. Auto Club
Ins. Ass'n, 457 N.W.2d 637 (Mich. 1990).
39. The Michigan no-fault insurance law requires an insurer to offer funeral benefits between
$1,750-$5,000 and limits work loss benefits to $1,000 per 30-day period. MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 24.13107(a), (b) (Callaghan Supp. 1993-94); cf. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1712 (Supp. 1990)
(providing no limitation on funeral expenses but requiring income loss benefit equal to 80% of actual
loss of gross income). See generally Lingle, supra note 4, at 96-97 (noting similarity between Act
6 and Michigan no-fault insurance law).
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virtually unlimited medical and rehabilitative expenses. 4  The Michigan
no-fault law contains no peer review procedures, but the Michigan
Legislature recently passed a bill with new cost controls that limits
medical benefits to $1,000,000.
4'
The private enterprise peer review system created under section
1797(b) is patterned after the federal peer review system.42 Medical
peer review has been used by the federal government for the past two
decades to monitor the quality and necessity of care provided to
Medicare beneficiaries. 43 Medicare peer review organizations are
physician-sponsored or physician access organizations under contract to
the Health Care Financing Administration.' Most Medicare peer
review organizations are physician-sponsored groups organized by
various state medical societies.45 The federal Medicare PROs, similar
40. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13107(1) provides that an insurer must pay all "[a]llowable
expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services
and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." Id.
41. See generally JOOST, supra note 3, § 6:22 (discussing the new no-fault reform provisions
in Michigan). The reform provisions, which are effective as of April 1, 1994, were designed to
control the spiraling medical costs that have negatively affected premiums. See Ruth Gastel, No-
Fault Auto Insurance, THE INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUJTE, Apr. 1994, page 3, available in
LEXIS, Insure library, IIABS file.
42. See4 !U.S.C. §§ 1302c to 1320c-4(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Since § 1797 is basedupon
the reimbursement levels established for the Medicare system, it was logical for the Legislature to
codify a peer review process similar to the one under the federal Medicare program. However,
while federal PROs may service private as well as public payors, there are only two such
organizations in Pennsylvania. Interview with Constance B. Foster, Insurance Commissioner of
Pennsylvania from Jan. 20, 1987 to February 28, 1992, Harrisburg, Pa. (November 6, 1992). Since
these organizations could not possibly cover the demand for peer review services under the MVFRL,
a separate industry of private PROs was created. Id.
43. In response to rising health care costs, Congress established Professional Standards Review
Organizations (PSROs) to monitor the quality and quantity of care provided to recipients of federal
health insurance. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 1151-1170, 86
Stat. 1329, 1429-45 (1972) (amended 1982). The PSROs were replaced with peer review
organizations in 1982. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-
248, sec. 143, § 1151-1163, 96 Stat. 324, 382-93 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2(a)to 1320c-2(t)
(1988)). There are currently 53 federal Medicare PRO's under contract to the Health Care
Financing Administration. See [1993-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH)
41,091, at 34775 (Mar. 2, 1993).
44. 42 C.F.R. § 462.101(a) (1993). According to Health Care Financing Administration
(HCFA) regulations, a "physician-sponsored organization" is composed of at least 10 percent of
licensed physicians in the practicing area. See 42 C.F.R. § 462.102(b) (1993). A "physician-access
organization" has a sufficient number of licensed physicians to assure adequate peer review of the
services provided by the various medical specialties. 42 C.F.R. § 462.103(a)(1) (1993).
45. See generally, Clark C. Havighurst, Professional Peer Review and the Antitrust Laws, 36
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1117, 1124 n.24 (1985-86). State medical societies had a strong financial
incentive to organize physician-sponsored PROs because the regulations allowed financial
intermediaries such as Blue Cross to be designated if a PRO could not be formed. Id. The
prevalence of physician-sponsored PROs is a reflection of this incentive.
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to the PROs established under Act 6, are required by law to provide peer
review services to private entities.' These professional peer review
organizations evaluate the utilization and quality of health care that is
provided under the Medicare system.47
Under the peer review procedures set forth in section 1797(b) of Act
6, an insurance company must contract with a private peer review
organization (PRO)4' for advice if it questions the medical necessity of
treatment by a health care provider.49 If the PRO determines that the
provider has rendered unnecessary medical treatment, the provider may
not collect payment for that service.' Although a policyholder or
provider may request the PRO to reconsider its initial determination,"'
the statute does not explicitly state whether failure to request
reconsideration bars judicial review. However, in the absence of an
insurer's request for peer review, a policyholder or provider may
judicially challenge the insurer's refusal to pay benefits. 2
There is one fundamental difference between the Pennsylvania and
federal peer review systems: private peer review under Act 6 is more
likely to unfairly favor the insurer. The mandated rate rollback measure
of Act 6 pressures insurance companies to maximize cost controls in an
effort to offset lost premium revenue. Because they are hired by
insurers, private PROs have a strong financial incentive to issue biased
reports in order to maintain a steady source of income from the insurance
companies. 3  In contrast, a physician reviewing care provided to a
46. 42U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a)(11)(1988). A PRO contracting with the federal government must
make its facilities and resources available for contracting with private and public entities "as feasible
and appropriate." Id.
47. 42C.F.R. § 462.71 (1993).
48. Peer review organizations are responsible for evaluating the reasonableness and necessity
of medical treatment provided to accident victims. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1702 (Supp. 1993).
Under Act 6, a PRO may be an organization which contracts with the federal Health Care Financing
Administration or the Commonwealth for review of Medicare or Medical Assistance services. Id.
A PRO may also be any health care review company that is approved by the Insurance
Commissioner. Id.
49. Id. § 1797(b)(1) (Supp. 1993). An insurer must request a review within 90 days of the
insurer's receipt of the provider's bill. Id. If an insurer challenges the necessity of medical
treatment within a thirty days of receiving a bill for such services, it has no obligation to pay the
health care provider until peer review is completed. Id. § 1797(b)(3). The insured may not be
billed for any treatment or services during the peer review process. Id.
50. Id. § 1797(b)(7). However. "[i]n no case does the failure of the provider to return the
payment obligate the insured to assume responsibility for payment for the treatment, services or
merchandise." Id.
51. Id. § 1797(b)(2). Requests for reconsideration must be made within 30 days of the PRO's
initial determination. Id.
52. Id. 1797(b)(4).
53. See Lehman v. State Farm Ins. Co., 140 Pitt. L.J. 78, 82 (C.P. Allegheny County 1992),
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Medicare beneficiary is immune from liability' and thus more likely to
render an objective opinion. Although federal Medicare PROs have cost-
containment objectives, they are equally interested in assuring that
Medicare recipients receive quality care and treatment.55 To the extent
that the peer review program under section 1797(b) is linked to cost
containment and financial incentives, a medically objective evaluation of
treatment has become increasingly difficult.5 6
III. PRO Reconsideration and an Insured's Right to Access a Judicial
Forum Under the Peer Review Process
Unfortunately, providers -and policyholders have little meaningful
ability to challenge the systemic peer review system bias. Although they
may request reconsideration of an adverse PRO determination,
reconsideration rarely results in reversal. As a result, insureds have
attempted to bypass reconsideration in favor of appealing directly to the
common pleas court." The legality of this strategy is currently before
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 9 after being the subject of divided
opinion among the lower courts. 6°
A. Lehman v. State Farm Insurance Co.:61 A Persuasive Argument
for the Right to Judicial Redress
In Lehman v. State Farm Insurance Co.,62 several plaintiffs who
were injured in automobile accidents brought an action in common pleas
overruled by Terminato v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Ins. Co., 618 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992),
allocatur granted, 631 A.2d 1010 (Pa. 1993).
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-6(c) (1988).
55. The Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) recently revised its approach to quality
assurance through a program called the Health Care Quality Improvement Initiative (HCQII). See
[1993-1 Transfer Binder] Medicare and Medicaid Guide (CCH) 41,091, at 34,773 (Mar. 2, 1993).
Under the HCQII, PROs are required to implement an educational feedback process with providers
to help them identify and correct quality control problems. Id. at 34,777.
56. The use of financial incentives to encourage medical providers to limit treatment has been
the subject of considerable discussion among health care experts. At least one commentator has
posited that cost control mechanisms should be disclosed to beneficiaries. See Edward B. Hirshfeld,
Should Third Party Payors ofHealth Care Services Disclose Cost Control Mechanisms To Potential
Beneficiaries?, 14 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 115 (1990).
57. See infra text and tables accompanying notes 106, 108.
58. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 75.
59. Terminatov. Pennsylvania Nat'l Ins. Co., 618 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), allocatur
granted, 631 A.2d 1010 (Pa. 1993).
60. See supra parts MI.A-B.
61. 140 Pitt. L.J. 78 (Allegheny County 1992), overruled by Terminato v. Pennsylvania
National Insurance Co., 618 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), allocatur granted, 631 A.2d 1010
(Pa. 1993).
62. Id.
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court to compel the payment of medical bills.63 Their claims were
denied by insurance carriers based on PRO determinations that the
treatment received was not medically necessary. " In Lehman, neither
the plaintiffs nor the medical providers sought reconsideration of the
adverse PRO decision.'
The plaintiffs argued that section 1797(b)(2), which states that
providers and insureds "may request a reconsideration.., of the PRO's
initial determination,"' should be interpreted as permissive rather than
mandatory.67 State Farm argued that the plaintiffs' complaint should be
dismissed because Act 6 did not provide a right to judicial review unless
an insurer denied payment without requesting peer review.' In
essence, State Farm argued that a PRO determination is a final award
similar to those entered pursuant to arbitration.69
The Lehman court denied State Farm's request for dismissal because
it believed that allowing judicial review was consistent with both the
language and purpose of section 1797.70 First, the court observed that
the plain language of section 1797(b)(4) merely states that judicial review
is available when an insurer has refused to pay benefits without
challenging the claim before a PRO. 7 The court noted that section
1797 contained no express language that would bar judicial review of
benefit claims that were subjected to peer review.' Second, the court
found that the purpose of section 1797 is to protect policyholders from
the denial of valid claims after an adverse PRO report.' 3 Allowing
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 1797(b)(2) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
67. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 83.
68. Id. at 81. See also 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1797(b)(4) (Supp. 1993) (right to judicial
review).
69. 140 Pitt. L.J. at 79-80.
70. Id. at 79-83. The court also relied on the Insurance Department's interpretation of this
provision. Id. at 81 n.4. The court noted that the Department's regulations interpreted Act 6 to
allow an insurer, provider, or insured to appeal in court any final PRO determination. Id. This
interpretation became part of the final regulations effectuating the cost saving mechanisms of § 1797.
See 31 PA. CODE § 69.52(m) (1993) (reproduced in Appendix B).
71. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 80-81. Act 6 states that providers and insureds "may challenge
before a court an insurer's refusal to pay for past or future medical treatment... the reasonableness
or necessity of which the insurer has not challenged before a PRO." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
1797(b)(4) (Supp. 1993).
72. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 81.
73. Id. at 81-82. The court found that this purpose was evidenced by § 1797(b)(6). Id. This
section provides costs and attorney fees to policyholders who successfully seek judicial review of
their insurers' failure to pay claims that were never submitted to a PRO. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1797(b)(6) (Supp. 1993). However, the court noted that an insurer's good faith compliance with
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judicial review of claims that were reviewed by a PRO would fulfill this
purpose. Consequently, the court held that a policyholder is not barred
from pursuing a court action for denial of claims that were reviewed by
a PRO.74
The Lehman court also rejected State Farm's alternative argument
that even if there were a right to judicial review, an insured who has not
requested a reconsideration is barred from appealing to the courts.'
This argument was based on the established administrative law principle
that a party must first exhaust administrative proceedings before seeking
redress in the courts.76 State Farm contended that if an insured were
not required to seek reconsideration before judicial redress, there would
be no incentive to ever request reconsideration.77 The court disagreed
with State Farm's prediction that the peer review system would be
rendered meaningless.78 The court wrote that insureds would still have
an incentive to seek reconsideration because they would not be able to
raise claims for bad faith and attorney fees in a subsequent court action
if they chose to bypass the reconsideration phase.79
The Lehman opinion is significant not because it rejected State
Farm's argument, but because of the reasoning it applied. In dicta, the
court discussed several reasons why it believed that the Legislature did
not intend the courts to treat a PRO determination like an arbitration
award or an administrative adjudication.' First, the court recognized
that the procedures governing peer review plans lack several of the
essential characteristics of an administrative proceeding."' Second, the
PRO procedures could be used as evidence to defeat subsequent claims for counsel fees. 140 Pitt.
L.J. at 83.
74. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 81-82.
75. Id. at 83. Accord Henry v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa.
1992); Elliott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 786 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1992); Riddell v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 91-1461, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13120 (M.D. Pa. July 9, 1992); Dunn
v. Pennsylvania Millers Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1130-C of 1992 (C.P. Luzerne County Dec. 3, 1992);
Snyder v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 91-50-0567601 (C.P. York County Oct. 1, 1992); Leake v.
Highland Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2229 of 1991 (C.P. Fayette County Apr. 16, 1992). Several of the
above rulings were decided before the Commissioner's regulations that interpreted section 1797(b)(4)
to require an insured to first seek reconsideration. See 31 PA. CODE § 69.52(m) (1993) (reproduced
in Appendix B).
76. Id. See, e.g., Concerned Taxpayers of Beaver County Board of Assessment Appeals, 462
A.2d 347 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) ("It is well settled that where the legislature provides a remedy
without preserving the parallel right to resort directly to the courts, that remedy is exclusive and
must be strictly pursued.").
77. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 84.
78. Id.
79. Id. See also supra note 73.
80. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 82.
81. Id. The court distinguished the peer review process from an administrative proceeding by
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court stated that the PRO was not a neutral body because the
policyholder plays no role in the PRO selection process and the PRO has
a strong financial incentive to side with the insurance company. 82 The
inherent lack of neutrality in the peer review process provided critical
support for the court's holding that the insured has a right to judicial
review after an initial adverse PRO determination.'
B. When "May" Means "Must": The Terminato Decision
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected Lehman in Terminato v.
Pennsylvania National Insurance Co.8' In Terminato, the plaintiff's
insurance company refused to pay various medical claims after a PRO
had determined that a portion of the treatment was not medically
necessary.' Without first seeking a PRO reconsideration, the plaintiff
filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County.'
The lower court dismissed the complaint.'
The superior court affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the basis
that the insured did not exhaust her statutory remedies before proceeding
to court.s The court disagreed with the insured's argument that the
word "may" under section 1797(b)(2) was used to indicate that a party
has a choice of either requesting reconsideration or appealing directly to
a court of law.89 The court opined:
To the contrary, the use of the word "may" indicates a party has a
choice between requesting reconsideration of the initial determination
or accepting the initial determination as binding . . . . In [other]
circumstances, we have interpreted words such as "may appeal" to
indicate an aggrieved party must exhaust the statutorily defined
noting that (1) there is no right to notice or to submit evidence prior to the initial PRO
determination, and (2) there is no requirement of notice to the insured after the determination. Id.
But see 31 PA. CODE § 69.52(e) (1993) (requiring that notice of an adverse PRO determination be
given to the provider and insured). In addition, the court differentiated the peer review process from
an administrative proceeding on the basis that a substantial percentage of first-party benefit claims
involve claims for both medical benefits and lost wages. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 82. Since §
1797(b)(4) does not address claims for lost wages, these claims continue to be resolved through
litigation in the courts based upon the 1984 Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. Id. The
court recognized that if it adopted State Farm's position that a PRO determination constitutes a final
award, there would be two types of judicial review in lawsuits involving identical issues. Id.
82. Lehman, 140 Pitt. L.J. at 82.
83. See id.
84. 618 A.2d 1032 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), allocatur granted, 631 A.2d 1010 (Pa. 1993).
85. Id. at 1033.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1038.
89. Terminato, 618 A.2d at 1035.
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remedy before proceeding to court .... Accordingly, the statute
does not indicate that a party in the Peer Review process can resort
directly to the courts, but must either appeal within the Peer Review
process or accept the PRO's initial determination as binding.'
The superior court held that judicial review of an adverse PRO
determination is available only after reconsideration has been
requested.9' The court defended its holding by noting that the
Insurance Department's regulations interpreting section 1797(b) allow for
judicial review only after reconsideration by a PRO.'
The apparent tension between the Lehman line of cases93 and the
majority opinion in Terminato was compounded further by Judge
Brosky's concurring opinion. Judge Brosky wrote that under the statute
an insured or medical provider could only resort to a court when the
insurer "(1) refuses to pay a provider's bill and (2) has not challenged
the medical necessity of the bill before a PRO. "I Consequently, Judge
Brosky reasoned that the right to judicial review exists only when peer
review procedures are not employed. 91 Thus, Judge Brosky believes
that providers and insureds may challenge adverse PRO decisions only
by requesting reconsideration and not by appealing to the courts.'
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania will have its first opportunity
to evaluate the peer review system when it reviews the superior court's
decision in Terminato. Although the issue was not directly raised in the
lower court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may be called upon to
consider the constitutional implications of its decision.' The next
section discusses the effect of such a decision on an insured's
constitutional right to a jury trial.
90. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1036 n.4. See also supra note 70.
93. See cases cited supra note 75.
94. Terminato, 618 A.2d at 1040 (Brosky, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 1041.
96. Id.
97. PA. R. APP. P. 302(a) provides that "[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." Id. However, the private Peer Review system is
quasi-administrative in nature. Terminato, 618 A.2d at 1036. Arguably, the rules of appellate
procedure for quasi-judicial orders is applicable. Under these rules, if a party raises the
constitutional validity of a commonwealth statute for the first time on appeal, the issue may be
considered by the appellate court. PA. R. APP. P. 1551(a); see, e.g., Dick's Delicatessen of Paoli,
Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 475 A.2d 1345 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (holding that
constitutional challenge to Workmen's Compensation Act must be considered although raised for the
first time on appeal). Although the issue may never be raised by counsel in Terminato, it could still
be raised in future cases.
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IV. The Theoretical and Practical Effect of Peer Review Procedures
on an Insured's Right to a Jury Trial
Theoretically, the peer review system should survive any direct
facial constitutional attack premised on the basis that the system
impermissibly burdens an insured's right to a jury trial. The
commonwealth court has held on more than one occasion that the PRO
provisions are constitutionally valid because the Insurance
Commissioner's regulations provide for a right to judicial review. 98
However, the private enterprise peer review system arguably reaches
beyond the limits of constitutional tolerance because it impermissibly
burdens the right to a jury trial with "onerous conditions, restrictions or
regulations which . ..make the right practically unavailable. " 99 The
peer review system under Act 6 is burdened with the same type of
bureaucratic inefficiencies that caused the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to declare a mandatory arbitration system unconstitutional."
In Mattos v. Thompson,' °' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the arbitration procedures of the Health Care Services Malpractice
Act' o2 were unconstitutional because the practical effectiveness of
arbitration screening panels resulted in an unconstitutional infringement
upon a medical malpractice claimant's right to a jury trial. 3 The
court found that the bureaucratic procedures under HCSMA were
incapable of achieving the Act's stated purpose: to allow efficient
adjudication of claims at minimal cost."° In particular, the court found
98. See, e.g., Hospital Ass'n of Pa., Inc. v. Foster, 629 A.2d 1055 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993);
Pennsylvania Medical Providers Ass'n v. Foster, 613 A.2d 51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). See also
31 PA. CODE § 69.52(m) (1993) (providing that "[ulpon determination of a reconsideration by a
PRO, an insurer, provider, or insured may appeal the determination to the courts").
99. Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (Pa. 1980) (quoting Parker v. Children's Hosp.
of Philadelphia, 394 A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. 1978) (quoting Smith's Case, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (1955),
appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955))).
100.Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980). See also Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291,
1294-96 (Pa. 1984) (explaining Mattos).
101. 421A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980).
102. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.101-.1006 (1992). October 15, 1975, the
Pennsylvania Legislature enacted the Health Care Services Malpractice Act in response to a
perceived nationwide malpractice insurance crisis. Id. § 1301.102. The Act gave health care
arbitration panels exclusive original jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims. Id. § 1301.309.
If a party was dissatisfied with a decision of the panel, judicial review by trial de nova was
permitted. Id. § 1301.509. The arbitration procedures have not been repealed and remain codified
at 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1301.308-.309, 1301.501-.514(1992).
103. Id. at 195. However, the court stated that arbitration remains "a viable alternative that
can be effective in many areas." Id. at 196. See also Heller v. Frankston, 475 A.2d 1291, 1294-96
(Pa. 1984) (explaining Mattos decision).
104. Id.
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that the lengthy delays in the arbitration system did in fact oppressively
burden the right to jury trial." The court relied on a detailed
statistical analysis which revealed that seventy-three percent of the cases
filed remained unresolved four years after the screening panels had been
introduced. 16
A statistical analysis of the current peer review system under Act 6
reveals different but equally practical burdens on an insured's right to a
jury trial. In addition, the current delay and expense of judicially
challenging adverse PRO determinations further oppresses this
constitutional right. The remainder of this section demonstrates how the
current peer review system impermissibly burdens the right of insureds
and providers to a jury trial.
A. Statistical Analysis of PRO Reports
The nature of the private relationship between insurers and PROs
encourages peer review determinations in favor of insurance companies.
While it may be difficult to demonstrate actual bias between an insurer
and a PRO in any given case, the existence of bias is not merely
theoretical. Peer review system partiality is evidenced by a review of
PRO reports compiled by the Insurance Commissioner. On a practical
level, this bias oppressively burdens the right to a jury trial.
A review of the 1992 Annual PRO Reports (Table I) compiled by
the Insurance Commissioner provides support for the existence of PRO
bias in favor of insurers. Table I shows that insurers submitted 18,874
initial determinations to PROs. Of these, 6539 (thirty-five percent) of
the claims submitted were denied payment because the treatment was not
reasonable or medically necessary. In addition, another 8209 claims
(forty-three percent) were partially denied payment. The largest number
of claims generally fall in this latter category because an automobile
accident victim receives treatment for a certain period of time before an
insurer contracts with a PRO to evaluate future treatment. While initial
treatment (in a hospital, for example) may be deemed reasonable and
necessary, follow-up care with a family doctor, chiropractor, or other
medical specialist is frequently denied in these "partial pay" cases.
105. Id. at 195.
106. Id.
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TABLE I
Summary 1992 Annual Report - Initial Determinations 7
Treatment Appropriate (Pay) 3,643 (19%)
Treatment Partially Appropriate (Partial Pay) 8,209 (43%)
Treatment Not Appropriate (Deny) 6,539 (35%)
Other 483 (3%)
Total Initial Determinations 18,874
Since nearly eighty percent of all first-party claims are subject to an
adverse peer review, insureds frequently request reconsideration.
Although an insurer must contract with another PRO to evaluate the
requested reconsideration, the same financial relationship that existed
with the first PRO is also present with the second PRO.' Table II
shows the 1992 summary statistics for reconsiderations requested as the
result of an adverse PRO report. The summary report indicates that
1827 (sixty-three percent) of the initial determinations were upheld while
another 565 (twenty percent) were partially modified. The modified
initial determinations generally uphold the initial peer review but provide
partial payment for treatment beyond the date specified in the initial
report. Thus, eighty-three percent of the initial determinations are for
the most part upheld.
107. Gregory S. Martino, Director, Bureau of Consumer Services, 1992 Peer Review Annual
Report (Feb. 3, 1994) (unpublished report on file with Pennsylvania Insurance Department in
Harrisburg, Pa.). Under the peer review regulations, PROs must file annual reports with the
Insurance Department by March 1 of each year. 31 PA. CODE § 69.54(b) (1993).
108. 31 PA. CODE § 69.52(i).
98 DICKINSON LAW REvIEw SPRING 1994
TABLE II
Summary 1992 Annual Report - Reconsiderations"°9
Initial Determination Upheld 1,827 (63 %)
Initial Determination Modified 565 (20%)
Initial Determination Reversed 440 (15%)
Other 60 (2%)
Total Reconsiderations 2,892
Reconsideration of an adverse PRO determination is often expensive
as well as unsuccessful. Reconsideration fees must be paid by the losing
party," ° who is usually the insured. The fees vary from $250 to $500,
depending on the nature and extent of the injuries being evaluated.",
In cases involving multiple injuries, such as head trauma and orthopedic
injuries, the insured may have to pay reconsideration fees on several
occasions." 2  As a result, an injured victim must often pay a
substantial amount of money to continue treating with an otherwise
apathetic medical provider.
The PRO reports support the theory that the private peer review
system is inherently biased in favor of the insurer. Unfortunately, the
expense and delays of reconsideration are placed squarely on the
shoulders of insureds and providers who wish to challenge the systemic
bias in the peer review system. Because PRO bias exists during both the
initial determination and reconsideration stages, reconsideration rarely
proves to be an effective way to protect insureds and providers from the
denial of valid claims. As a result, many insureds and providers are now
forced to hire an attorney to protect their interests. Higher attorney
involvement has a long-term negative impact on insurance premiums and
109. Martino, supra note 106.
110. 31 PA. CODE § 69.52(h) (1993). Section 69.52(h) provides that "[a]n insurer shall make
full payment of the charge for reconsideration to the PRO, but the amount paid for the
reconsideration shall be ultimately borne by the party against whom a reconsideration determination
is made." Id.
111. Interview with James R. Ronca, Esq., Partner in the law firm of Schmidt & Ronca, P.C.,
Harrisburg, PA (Nov. 20, 1993) (Mr. Ronca is a distinguished trial attorney, expert on automobile
insurance law, and a former president of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyer's Association).
112. Id.
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detracts from the cost control goals of Act 6.113 On a practical level,
this biased system discourages insureds from engaging in what is likely
to be an expensive and futile challenge to the denial of their claims.
B. Judicial Challenges to Peer Review System Bias
It is often difficult to demonstrate actual bias between an insurance
company and a PRO in any given case. Thus, in addition to the
underlying automobile tort action, the medical provider or insured is
forced to start a separate proceeding against the insurance company for
non-payment of first-party benefits. The multiplicity of bad faith and
RICO actions has led to further delay and increased litigation costs for
the parties involved.
1. Bad faith actions.-Act 6 created a new statutory cause of action
against an insurer when the insurer has acted in bad faith during the
investigation and settlement of a policyholder's claim. "4 In a bad faith
claim, the court is permitted to award interest on the amount of the
claim, award punitive damages against the insurer, and assess court costs
and attorney fees."' As a result of the new cause of action, trial
courts throughout the Commonwealth have been swamped with pre-trial
motions involving the applicability of a bad faith cause of action against
an insurer for denial of first-party benefits." 6
Many of the bad faith actions alleged that the PROs acted outside
the scope of the peer review provisions and were a sham to deny valid
claims. For example, in Daumer v. Allstate Insurance Co.,117 the
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss a bad faith claim because
a PRO was improperly used to determine whether the injury to which the
medical expenses were attributable was causally related to a motor
113. The greater the percentage of claims that are represented by attorneys, the higher the
average insurance premiums in that state. See generally JOOST, supra note 3, § 10:12 (discussing
the relationship between cost of insurance and percentage of claims represented by attorneys).
114. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (Supp. 1993). For a detailed analysis of the bad faith
provision, see generally C. Christopher Hasson & Michael F. Nerone, The 1990 Pennsylvania
Insurance Law: An Analysis of "Bad Faith" and the "Limited Tort Option," 29 DuQ. L. REv. 619
(1991).
115. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8371 (Supp. 1993). Interest is awarded on the amount of the
claim from the date the claim was made by the insured. Id. The interest rate is 3 % above the prime
rate. Id.
116. See, e.g., Livecchi v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 91-3712, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1105 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 5, 1992) (mem.); Seeger v. Allstate Ins. Co., 776 F. Supp. 986
(M.D. Pa. 1991) (mem.); Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 763 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa.
.1991); Danton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 91-0013, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4621
(E.D. Pa. April 4, 1991) (mer.).
117. No.91-7570, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3386 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 1992).
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vehicle accident."' The determination of causation and other coverage
issues was clearly beyond the scope of peer review and should not have
been resolved by a PRO." 9 In other cases, PRO determinations have
included language so vague and uncertain that they naturally encourage
litigation. "2
2. RICO Actions.-The pending RICO..' claims represent the
pinnacle of litigation against the cost containment provisions of Act 6.
These claims are based on the contractual relationship between insurers
and PROs, which often leads to peer review reports in favor of the
insurance company. 12  In Brownell v. State Farm Mutual Insurance
Co., 2 the plaintiff alleged that State Farm and its PRO had conspired
to reduce or refuse payments on any claims involving a soft tissue
injury. 12 4  More significantly, the plaintiff alleged that the PRO
evaluated the claims adversely in return for a contingency fee from State
Farm which used the evaluations to deny valid claims. 1"5 The court
recognized that the availability of a RICO-fraud action could impair the
118. Id.
119. Id. Under section 1797(b), a PRO may only be utilized to confirm whether treatment
provided conforms to professional standards of performance or is medically necessary. 75 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1797(b)(1) (Supp. 1993). Because PROs consist of medical professionals who
review the work of their medical peers, a PRO review of legal questions is not "peer" review at all.
See Daumer, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *11 n.6; see also Carson v. ITT Hartford Ins. Group, No.
91-3113, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10451 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1991)(mem.)(denying a bad faith claim
based on an adverse PRO evaluation but explaining that such actions may be permitted in those cases
not involving the peer review process).
120. See, e.g., Cenkner v. State Farm Ins. Co., 142 Pitt. L.J. 12, 17 ("[E]fforts to give legal
significance to these evaluations through an analysis based on the language of the law creates both
uncertainty and a breeding ground for litigation.").
121. Racketeernfluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988
& Supp. IV 1993). The federal RICO statute was enacted in 1970 as Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act. Id. Section 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through
a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id. § 1962(c) (1988). Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiracies to violate this provision. Id. § 1962(d).
Although the statute was originally designed to step up prosecution of organized crime, the Supreme
Court has now made it clear that RICO is applicable in a civil proceeding. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
122. See supra Part IV.A.
123. 757F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
124. Id. at 529.
125. Id. at 538. Current Pennsylvania regulations now require a PRO to charge for its services
on a flat fee or hourly basis; they expressly prohibit any percentage or contingency fee basis. 31
PA. CODE § 69.55(b)(4) (1994). These regulations were not in effect at the time of the alleged
misconduct in this case.
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integrity of the peer review process," but determined that the
application of RICOo to an alleged conspiracy that undermines the
integrity of the peer review process would serve to supplement rather
than supplant state law. 27
If properly conducted, the peer review process under section
1797(b) is a legitimate medium to limit unnecessary treatment.
However, if an insurance company manipulates the peer review process
to deny benefits for liability claims, bad faith and RICO claims should
be permitted to uphold the integrity of the peer review program.
Unfortunately, the additional time and expense required to litigate these
complex issues may prove to be too burdensome for insureds.
V. A Statutory Recommendation
Few would disagree that Act 6 was a legitimate and necessary
response to spiraling insurance premiums in Pennsylvania. Capping
medical expenses based on prevailing Medicare rates was a plausible
approach to achieve cost savings for consumers." Insurers
experienced initial administrative costs to convert to utilization of the
Medicare payment system, but the lower payments to providers has
resulted in increased savings over time.129 Most of the recently
reported $1.4 billion in premium savings under the law are due to the
capping of medical costs." Indeed, the success of the Medicare
reimbursement scheme under Act 6 is evidenced by the Legislature's
inclusion of Medicare caps in the 1993 amendments to the Workmen's
Compensation Act.' 3
126. 757F. Supp. at 536.
127. Id. The court supported its holding that a RICO action is applicable by noting that
§ 1797(b) was not in effect at the time of the alleged conduct and therefore, any peer review
procedures were voluntary and nonbinding. Id.
128. An estimated 98% of medical providers participate in the Medicare program. Foster
Interview, supra note 42. Therefore, the medicare payment system was a feasible approach to
restricting health care costs for treatment provided to accident victims. Id.
129. The Insurance Commissioner's final report to the Independent Regulatory Review
Commission (IRRC) indicated that administrative costs associated with converting to the Medicare
payment system would amount to a one-time cost increase of 1.5%, while the Medicare cost
limitations and peer review provision would enable insurers to achieve about 20.9% in cost savings.
Constance B. Foster, IRRC Regulation No. 11-91, Ins. Dep't, Automobile Medical Cost
Containment, 5A (Sept. 5, 1991) (unpublished Regulatory Analysis Form on file with the
Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau).
130. Penn. Gov. Says Reform has Generated Big Savings in Auto Ins., Executive Letter, Jan.
11, 1993, at 4, available in LEXIS, Insure library, IABS file.
131. SeeWorkers' CompensationAct, Act No. 1993-44, sec. 8, § 306(f. 1)(3)(i), 1993 Pa. Laws
190, 202-203.
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Although the Medicare fee limitations are a justifiable cost-savings
mechanism, the private enterprise peer review system has created
considerable debate and expensive on-going litigation.'32 The financial
relationship between insurance companies and PROs has created a system
that contains a substantial propensity to render biased peer review reports
in favor of the insurer. ' In addition, the expense and bureaucratic
delays of the private peer review system may cause valid claims to
remain unchallenged and infringe on an insured's constitutional right to
a jury trial."
In light of the inherent conflicts of interest and potential
constitutional problems that exist within the private peer review system,
the Legislature should consider restructuring the peer review procedures
set forth in section 1797(b). Health care costs and insurance premiums
could be reduced by eliminating the private enterprise peer review system
that has led to so much costly litigation. The Legislature should replace
the private peer review system with one similar to that which it recently
enacted under the 1993 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation
Act. 
35
The new Workers' Compensation Act is intended to control
escalating health care costs in the treatment of work-related injuries and
diseases. 36  The Act contains provisions for peer review'37 and
utilization review. 3' There is a fundamental difference, however,
between the peer review system under the Workers' Compensation Act
and the one established under Act 6. The Workers' Compensation Act
provides that PROs must be randomly assigned by the Bureau of
Workers' Compensation.'39 The selection of a PRO by an independent
administrative body ensures impartiality by avoiding a private contractual
relationship between insurance companies and PROs.
132. Although insurance companies have always utilized an internal peer review program, the
peer review process under section 1797(b) has actually increased litigation costs for all parties
involved. Ronca Interview, supra note 111. More significantly, many doctors are now refusing to
treat automobile accident victims because they may be drawn into long-term litigation to recover
medical payments and may never be reimbursed. Id.
133. See supra part IV.A.
134. See supra part IV.
135. Workers' Compensation Act, Act No. 1993-44, sec. 15, § 420, 1993 Pa. Laws 190, 213-
14 (amending 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 831-32).
136.
137. Sec. 15, § 420, 1993 Pa. Laws at 213-14 (amending 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 831-
32).
138. Sec. 8, § 306(f. 1)(6), 1993 Pa. Laws at 204-205.
139. Sec. 15, § 420(a), 1993 Pa. Laws at 213 (amending 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 831).
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The Insurance Commissioner's regulations could easily be modified
to adopt a system that is consistent with the peer review procedures
under the Workers' Compensation Act. An administrative body similar
to the Bureau of Worker's Compensation could be created to randomly
assign PROs. This should not be cost-prohibitive in light of the working
relationship that already exists between the executive agencies at Labor
and Industry and Insurance."4 The administrative system in place at
the Bureau of Worker's Compensation could easily be adopted by the
Insurance Department to accommodate the peer review system under the
automobile statute. The arbitrary assignment of PROs would effectuate
the Legislature's intent to reduce insurance premiums without denying
valid claims for reimbursement.
VI. Conclusion
Act 6 was designed to curtail skyrocketing insurance premiums by
restricting health care costs and tort lawsuits. The peer review procedure
under section 1797 was one of the primary cost saving mechanisms used
to justify the rate rollbacks mandated by the Act. In theory, the concept
of professional peer review is an effective method of ensuring quality
health care at an affordable price.
Unfortunately, the private peer review system set forth in section
1797 focuses exclusively on the reduction of costs, perhaps to the
exclusion of quality. To the extent that insurers use peer review
organizations as a self-justifying rubber stamp to deny whole categories
of treatment, the system will only increase litigation and the costs
involved for all parties. In the absence of remedial legislation proposed
by this Comment, the peer review program may actually increase health
care costs and litigation, thereby frustrating the express purpose of Act
6.
John F. Duggan
140. In fact, for a six-month interim period after the effective date of Act 44 (August 31, 1993),
the Department of Labor and Industry adopted the list of PROs approved by the Insurance
Department under Act 6. 23 Pa. Bull. at 4191.
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APPENDIX A
75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1797 (Supp. 1993)
(a) General rule.-A person or institution, providing... [medical
services] to an injured person for an injury covered by... [automobile
insurance] ... shall not require... payment for the [services] in excess
of 110% [of the Medicare reimbursement allowances]; . . . or the
provider's usual and customary charge, whichever is less. The General
Assembly finds that the [Medicare reimbursement allowances] . . . are
an appropriate basis to calculate payment for [medical services] for
injuries covered by [automobile insurance] . . . . If acute care is
provided in an acute care facility to a patient with an immediately life-
threatening or urgent injury by a Level I or Level II trauma center...
or a major burn injury patient by a burn facility. . ., the amount of the
payment may not exceed the usual and customary charge. Providers
subject to this section may not bill the insured directly but must bill the
insurer for a determination of the amount payable. The provider shall
not bill or otherwise attempt to collect from the insured the difference
between the provider's full charge and the amount paid by the insurer.
(b) Peer review plan for challenges to reasonableness and
necessity of treatment.-
(1) Peer review plan.-Insurers shall contract jointly or
separately with any peer review organization established for the
purpose of evaluating treatment, health care services, products or
accommodations provided to any injured person. Such evaluation
shall be for the purpose of confirming that such treatment, products,
services or accommodations conform to the professional standards
of performance and are medically necessary. An insurer's challenge
must be made to a PRO within 90 days of the insurer's receipt of
the provider's bill for treatment or services or may be made at any
time for continuing treatment or services.
(2) PRO reconsideration. -An insurer, provider or insured
may request a reconsideration by the PRO of the PRO's initial
determination. Such a request for reconsideration must be made
within 30 days of the PRO's initial determination. If
reconsideration is requested for the services of a physician or other
licensed health care professional, then the reviewing individual must
be, or the reviewing panel must include, an individual in the same
specialty as the individual subject to review.
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(3) Pending determinations by PRO.-If the insurer
challenges within 30 days of receipt of a bill for medical treatment
or rehabilitative services, the insurer need not pay the provider
subject to the challenge until a determination has been made by the
PRO. The insured may not be billed for any treatment,
accommodations, products or services during the peer review
process.
(4) Appeal to court.-A provider of medical treatment or
rehabilitative services or merchandise or an insured may challenge
before a court an insurer's refusal to pay for past or future medical
treatment or rehabilitative services or merchandise, the
reasonableness or necessity of which the insurer has not challenged
before a PRO. Conduct considered to be wanton shall be subject to
payment of treble damages to the injured party.
(5) PRO determination in favor of provider or insured.-If
a PRO determines that medical treatment or rehabilitative services
or merchandise were medically necessary, the insurer must pay to
the provider the outstanding amount plus interest at 12% per year
on any amount withheld by the insurer pending PRO review.
(6) Court determination in favor of provider or
insured.-If, pursuant to paragraph (4), a court determines that
medical treatment or rehabilitative services or merchandise were
medically necessary, the insurer must pay to the provider the
outstanding amount plus interest at 12%, as well as the costs of the
challenge and all attorney fees.
(7) Determination in favor of insurer.-If it is determined by
a PRO or court that a provider has provided unnecessary medical
treatment or rehabilitative services or merchandise or that future
provision of such treatment, services or merchandise will be
unnecessary, or both, the provider ma& not collect payment for the
medically unnecessary treatment, services or merchandise. If the
provider has collected such payment, it must return the amount paid
plus interest at 12% per year within 30 days. In no case does the
failure of the provider to return the payment obligate the insured to
assume responsibility for payment for the treatment, services or
merchandise.
(c) Review authorized.-By December 1, 1991, the Legislative
Budget and Finance Committee shall commence a review of the impact
of this section. Such review may be conducted biennially.
98 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1994
APPENDIX B
31 PA. CODE § 69.52 (1993)
The Insurance Department enacted the following regulation to clarify and
effectuate the peer review process codified at 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1797(b) (Supp. 1993):
§ 69.52. Peer review procedures.
(a) A provider's bill shall be referred to a PRO only when
circumstances or conditions relating to medical and rehabilitative services
provided cause a prudent person, familiar with PRO procedures,
standards and practices, to believe it necessary that a PRO determine the
reasonableness and necessity of care, the appropriateness of the setting
where the care is rendered, and the appropriateness of the delivery of the
care. An insurer shall notify a provider, in writing, when referring bills
for PRO review at the time of the referral.
(b) An insurer shall make a referral to a PRO within 90 days of the
insurer's receipt of sufficient documentation supporting the bill. An
insurer shall pay bills for care that are not referred to a PRO within 30
days after the insurer receives sufficient documentation supporting the
bill. If an insurer makes its referral after the 30th day and on or before
the 90th day, the provider's bill for care shall be paid.
(c) During an initial determination, a PRO shall request in writing
from the provider the records and documents necessary to undertake its
review. The PRO shall afford the provider an opportunity to discuss the
case with the reviewer and fo submit information to the reviewer prior
to a final determination.
(d) A PRO's initial determination shall be completed within 30 days
after the receipt of requested information. When a provider fails to
respond to the PRO's inquiry or provide requested information, a PRO
may commence its review 30 days after the request for information is
postmarked. If additional information critical for the outcome of the
determination is submitted by a provider or requested by a PRO, the 30-
day review period may be tolled up to 20 days for the information to be
received and taken into consideration.
PEER REVIEW ORGANIZATIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA
(e) A PRO shall provide a written analysis, including specific
reasons for its decision, to insurers, which shall within 5 days of receipt,
provide copies to providers and insureds. Without the written analysis,
the review may not be considered an initial determination and unpaid
provider bills subject to the review shall be paid by the insurer. An
insurer may request another initial determination if the request is made
within 90 days of its receipt of the bill and supporting documentation in
accordance with § 69.52(b) (relating to peer review procedures). The
written analysis of the initial determination shall notify all parties that
they have 30 days from the day the initial determination is effected to
request a reconsideration and the process and location for filing a request
for reconsideration.
(f) A PRO's initial determination resulting in the denial of a
provider's claim, in whole or in part, shall be effected by a licensed
practitioner of like specialty or a licensed practitioner with experience
providing and prescribing the care subject to the review.
(g) Absent a change of condition, a decision of not medically
necessary by the PRO is basis for an insurer to deny payment for similar
services to the same insured resulting from the same accident. The
insured or subsequent provider has the right to request a reconsideration
of the initial determination for subsequent treatment or services received
or provided.
(h) An insurer, provider or insured may request, in writing,
reconsideration of the initial PRO determination within 30 days from the
date the initial determination is effected. A PRO may set a reasonable
charge for a reconsideration but the charge for a reconsideration may not
exceed the charge for the initial review. An insurer shall make full
payment of the charge for reconsideration to the PRO, but the amount
paid for the reconsideration shall be ultimately borne by the party against
whom a reconsideration determination is made.
(i) A reconsideration shall be effected by a licensed practitioner of
like specialty as the provider subject to the reconsideration review. The
licensed practitioner effecting the reconsideration review may not be the
same licensed practitioner who rendered the PRO's initial determination.
(j) A PRO shall afford the party requesting reconsideration an
opportunity to discuss the case with the reviewer and to submit additional
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information identified by the reviewer before making a final
determination of the reconsideration.
(k) A reconsideration shall be based upon the information that led
to the initial determination, new information found in medical records or
additional evidence submitted by the requesting party.
(1) A PRO shall complete a reconsideration within 30 days after
receipt of the information submitted under subsection (k). If additional
information -critical for the outcome of the determination is submitted by
a provider or requested by a PRO, the 30-day review period may be
tolled up to 20 days for the information to be received and taken into
consideration. A PRO shall send written notification of the
reconsideration determination to the insurer, which shall within 5 days
of receipt provide copies to providers and insureds. The written notice
shall contain the basis and rationale for the reconsideration
determination.
(in) Upon determination of a reconsideration by a PRO, an insurer,
provider or insured may appeal the determination to the courts.
(n) The insured may not be billed during the peer review process.
